STATEMENT

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American Medical Association,

to the

Missouri Department of Insurance,
Financial Institutions and Professional Registration

RE: Aetna Application for the Proposed Acquisition of Humana

May 19, 2016

The American Medical Association (AMA) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments regarding the Aetna, Inc. (Aetna) application for the proposed acquisition of Humana, Inc. (Humana). We believe that high insurance market concentration is an important issue of public policy because the anticompetitive effects of insurers’ exercise of market power poses a substantial risk of harm to consumers. Our analysis of data related to the proposed merger reveals significant concerns with respect to the impact on consumers in terms of health care access, quality and affordability.

The AMA has analyzed the likely competitive effects of this proposed merger both in the sell-side market for insurance and the buy-side market for physician services. We have also considered data on competition in health insurance in recent studies on the effects of health insurance mergers.

We have reviewed this matter from our long-standing perspective that competition in health insurance, not consolidation, is the right prescription for health insurer markets. Competition will lower premiums, force insurers to enhance customer service, pay bills accurately and on time, and develop and implement innovative ways to improve quality while lowering costs. Competition also allows physicians to bargain for contract terms that touch all aspect of patient care.

We have concluded that this merger will likely impair access, affordability and innovation in the sell-side market for health insurance, and on the buy-side, will deprive physicians of the ability to negotiate competitive health insurer contract terms. The result will be detrimental to consumers. “If past is prologue,” notes Northwestern University Professor Leemore S. Dafny, PhD, “insurance consolidation will tend to lead to lower payments to healthcare providers, but those lower payments will not be passed on to consumers. On the contrary, consumers can expect higher insurance premiums.”¹ For these reasons, the AMA concludes that the proposed

¹ See Dafny, “Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: What Do We Know From the Past, Is It Relevant in Light of the ACA, and What Should We Ask?”, Testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, September 22, 2015, at 10.
merger “would substantially lessen competition.” Accordingly, Aetna’s application to acquire Humana should be denied.

THE HEALTH INSURER MERGER WOULD CREATE, ENHANCE OR ENTRENCH MARKET POWER IN THE SALE OF HEALTH INSURANCE

Medicare Advantage Comprises a Product Market That Is Separate and Distinct from Traditional Medicare

Aetna acknowledges that its acquisition of Humana is “primarily about Medicare.” As discussed below, in Missouri the merger would substantially increase the market concentration of numerous already highly concentrated Medicare Advantage (MA) markets. Aetna’s response is that MA consumers have the option of switching between MA and traditional Medicare (TM) operated by the government. Moreover, claims Aetna, MA is not a relevant product market because any small but significant and non-transitory increase in the quality adjusted price of MA demanded by a combined Aetna/Humana would be defeated by the government as a competitor offering TM.

Aetna has mischaracterized the federal government’s role. The federal government is not an Aetna competitor attempting to compete for Medicare business. Instead the government is a purchaser procuring competitive bids from private health insurers competing to offer MA plans to Medicare beneficiaries. Congress’s goal in establishing the MA program was “that vigorous competition among private MA insurers…would lead those insurers to offer seniors a wider array of health insurance choices and richer and more affordable benefits than TM does, and be more responsive to seniors.” In the event Aetna were to acquire Humana, and competition for the government contract and MA beneficiaries were lessened, the government would actually be harmed, not advantaged, as would be the case if it were a competitor, by the higher prices and/or poorer service offered by a combined Aetna/Humana in MA. Accordingly, once the government is understood as a purchaser, there is a relevant MA market in which the proposed acquisition clearly lessens competition substantially.

Moreover, seniors are not likely to switch away from MA plans to TM in sufficient numbers to make an anticompetitive price increase or reduction in quality unprofitable to a MA insurer. In MA plans, Medicare pays most or all of the premiums to a private insurer. Most MA plans are health maintenance organizations (HMOs). In return for reduced choice of providers and

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2 § 382.095 RSMo (Supp. 2015).
3 See, Testimony of Mark Bertolini, CEO of Aetna, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (September 22, 2015) at 2.
4 See, Id at 5.
7 A Center for American Progress Study has concluded that Medicare program spending would increase as a result of the merger. Spiro, Calsyn, O’Toole, “Bigger is not Better: Proposed Insurer Mergers are Likely to Harm Consumers and Taxpayers,” Center for American Progress (Jan. 21, 2016)
8 See, Comments of H.E. Frech III PhD, Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara to the California Department of Insurance (May 16, 2016 ) (Comments of Professor Frech) at 12. See Exhibit A,
9 Id.
utilization review, the Medicare beneficiary obtains more complete coverage. A Medicare beneficiary who wants to join an HMO has no other practical choice. TM is a very different type of plan than MA plans. It has no panels and no serious utilization review. Indeed, TM is the only surviving large-scale example of traditional indemnity insurance.

TM provides unrestricted choice of provider but its benefit design exposes a beneficiary to risk of high out-of-pocket responsibilities. In 2013-14, 16 percent of Medicare beneficiaries faced out-of-pocket responsibilities that exceeded 20 percent of their annual income. Purchase of a private Medicare supplement can reduce the risk of high out-of-pocket responsibilities, but at a fairly high cost. MA insurance, on the other hand, leads to less risk of high out-of-pocket responsibilities. MA plans cover more services than TM and they are required to have an out-of-pocket maximum that limits the risk exposure of beneficiaries. In MA plans, the average out-of-pocket maximum was $5,014 per year per beneficiary in 2015.

Consent decrees that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has entered into with Humana and Arcadian Management and with UnitedHealth Group and Sierra Health Services (Consent Decrees) rightly observe that TM is not an adequate substitute for MA because MA plans offer substantially richer benefits at lower costs than TM, including lower copayments, lower coinsurance, caps on total yearly out-of-pocket costs, prescription drug coverage, and supplemental benefits that TM does not cover, such as dental and vision coverage, and health club memberships. Moreover, in MA plans, seniors can receive a single plan covering a variety of benefits that seniors in TM must assemble themselves.

The combination of richer benefits and one stop shopping accounts for the strong preference by many seniors for MA plans. Over the long-term, MA plans are slowly increasing in share, attracting 31 percent of Medicare beneficiaries in 2015. Research is consistent with the idea that beneficiaries treat MA plans as distinctly preferable to TM. Analysis of MA enrollees who were terminated because their plan left the market overwhelmingly (95 percent) actively sought another MA plan.

Further, MA utilization control for hospitals appears to be quite strict, lending force to the idea that MA and TM are functionally different products. A recent study has found that when MA beneficiaries had to switch to TM, their hospital utilization and costs rose substantially.

10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id at 12-13.
16 Id.
18 See, Comments of Prof. Frech at 12
19 Id. at 13.
20 Id. at 13.
21 Id at 13.
Consequently, the closest competition to one MA insurer’s plan is another insurer’s MA plan and the presence of many competing MA insurers is what keeps quality and price competitive. This conclusion is buttressed by a recent study finding that when Humana offers a MA plan in the same county as Aetna, Aetna’s premium is lower than in counties where Humana does not offer a plan.\(^{22}\)

Additional research indicates that where there are fewer MA insurers, premiums are higher, showing that neither TM nor commercial insurance is a serious constraint on MA pricing, regardless of the number or concentration of other insurers, in that market.\(^{23}\)

In sum, MA plans compete for consumers in a separate relevant market where the likely effect of an Aetna acquisition of Humana in Missouri markets is a substantial lessening of competition.

**Tests to Measure Anticompetitive Effects**

Competition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which have any significant market share. Unfortunately, MA markets in Missouri are “highly concentrated,” meaning that the size, size distribution and number of firms in these markets raise substantial risks that a merged Aetna/Humana would substantially lessen competition.

There are at least two ways of measuring market concentration and the degree of danger to competition that a merger poses. One test, adopted by the 2015 National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act (NAIC Model Act), looks to the four firm concentration ratio (CR4). This concentration ratio is calculated by summing the market shares of the four largest insurers in the market. Missouri employs the CR4 test.

A different test is adopted by the federal enforcement agencies in their 2010 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Horizontal Merger Guidelines). These federal guidelines use the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of every firm in the relevant market. Markets with HHIs less than 1500 are characterized as unconcentrated. Those with HHIs between 1500 and 2500 are moderately concentrated, and those with HHIs higher than 2500 are highly concentrated.

The AMA has determined that under either method above for measuring concentration, numerous highly populated Missouri MA markets are concentrated or highly concentrated. Moreover, as explained below, the Aetna/Humana merger would increase the concentration of numerous already concentrated health insurance markets to the extent that under the Missouri CR4 test the merger creates a prima facie violation of the Missouri competitive standard and under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the merger would be presumed likely to enhance market power.

\(^{22}\) Spiro et al, supra n. 7

\(^{23}\) See, Comments of Prof. Frech at 13-14.
In a Statewide Market, the Merger Violates Both Federal Merger Guidelines and the Missouri Competitive Standard

Under the Missouri competitive standard, a highly concentrated market is one in which the sum of the market shares of the four largest insurers—the so-called four-firm concentration ratio—is 75 percent or more of the market. Utilizing data obtained from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the U.S. Census Bureau, the combined shares of the four largest MA insurers in a Missouri statewide market total a whopping 96.6 percent dwarfing by comparison the national four firm concentration ratio for airlines of 62 percent. In such a highly concentrated Missouri MA market, there is a prima facie violation of the Missouri competitive standard when a firm with a 10 percent market share merges with a firm with a 2 percent or more market share. In the instant case, a prima facie violation of the Missouri competitive standard is easily established: Aetna’s share is 31.9 percent and Humana’s is 23.1 percent. The merger would also run afoul of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines since Missouri’s MA market has an HHI of 2610 (and thus highly concentrated) and the increase in the HHI caused by the merger would be 1320.

With Respect to Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the Merger Would Again Run Afoul of Both the Federal Antitrust Merger Enforcement Guidelines and the Missouri Competitive Standard

In a number of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) for MA in Missouri, the merger of Aetna and Humana are presumed likely to enhance market power under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Even pre-merger, these Missouri MSAs are all highly concentrated with HHIs over 2500. In the Joplin MSA, the post-merger HHI market concentration would be 7152, for an increase of 3466 points. Similarly, in the Kansas City, Missouri-Kansas market the post-merger HHI would be 6995 with a 3297 point increase; Jefferson City would have an HHI of 6217 with a 2722 point increase; Springfield would have an HHI of 4909 with a 1755 point increase; Columbia would have an HHI of 3730 with a 827 point increase; and finally St. Louis would have a post-merger HHI of 3118 with a 270 point increase. Moreover, in each of the aforementioned populous MSAs, the merger would violate the Missouri competitive standard, meaning that in all of them the shares of the four largest insurers total 75 percent or more, Aetna’s market share is 10 percent or more and Humana’s is 2 percent or more.


25 See Table 1.

26 Following the example of DOJ, the AMA has measured market concentration by using the HHI. The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares of every firm in the relevant market. Markets with HHIs less than 1500 are characterized as unconcentrated. Those with HHIs between 1500 and 2500 are moderately concentrated, and those with HHIs more than 2500 are highly concentrated. Mergers in moderately concentrated markets that change the HHI by more than 100 are deemed by the merger guidelines to potentially raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny. Mergers in highly concentrated markets that raise the HHI more than 200 are presumed likely to enhance market power.

27 See Table 2.

28 See Table 3.
In sum, under both the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the Missouri competitive standard, the merger would create market structures that would likely result in anticompetitive effects. Consequently, the merger should not be approved.

**BARRIERS TO ENTRY**

The market share and concentration data do not overstate the mergers’ future competitive significance in health insurance and physician markets. This is not a case where new market entry could defeat an exercise of monopoly or monopsony power. Instead, lost competition through a merger of health insurers is likely to be permanent and acquired health insurer market power would be durable because barriers to entry prevent the higher profits often associated with concentrated markets from allowing new entrants to restore competitive pricing. These barriers include state regulatory requirements; the need for sufficient business to permit the spreading of risk; and contending with established insurance companies that have built long-term relationships with employers and other consumers.\(^{(29)}\) In addition, a DOJ study of entry and expansion in the health insurance industry found that “brokers typically are reluctant to sell new health insurance plans, even if those plans have substantially reduced premiums, unless the plan has strong brand recognition or a good reputation in the geographic area where the broker operates.”\(^{(30)}\)

Perhaps the greatest obstacle is the so-called chicken and egg problem of health insurer market entry: health insurer entrants need to attract customers with competitive premiums that can only be achieved by obtaining discounts from providers. However providers usually offer the best discounts to incumbent insurers with significant business—volume discounting that reflects a reduction in transaction costs and greater budget certainty. Hence, incumbent insurers have a durable cost advantage.\(^{(31)}\)

The presence of significant entry barriers in health insurance markets was demonstrated in the 2008 hearings before the Pennsylvania Insurance Department on the competition ramifications of the proposed merger between Highmark Inc. and Independence Blue Cross. Substantial evidence was introduced in those hearings, showing that replicating the Blues’ extensive provider networks constituted a major barrier to entry. The evidence further demonstrated that there has been very little in the way of new entry that might compete with the dominant Blues Plans in the Pennsylvania health insurance markets. In a report commissioned by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department, LECG concluded that it was unlikely that any competitor would be able to step into the market after a Highmark/IBC merger:

> [B]ased on our interviews of market participants and other evidence, there are a number of barriers to entry—including the provider cost advantage enjoyed by the dominant firms in those areas and the strength of the Blue brand in those


\(^{(31)}\) Id. at 7.
areas...On balance, the evidence suggests that to the extent the proposed consolidation reduces competition, it is unlikely that other health insurance firms will be able to step in and replace the loss in competition.32

The merging health insurers have argued that times have changed and the health insurance marketplaces have made entry easy. The facts however do not bear out that claim. Recent state developments only highlight the barrier to entry problem. The New York Times recently reported “tough going for health co-ops” created under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) to inject competition into health insurance markets.33 According to the New York Times, many co-ops “appear to be scrambling to have enough money to cover claims as well as enroll new customers as they enter their third year.” According to the Washington Post of October 10, 2015, nearly half of the 23 ACA insurance co-ops, subsidized by millions of dollars in government loans, have been told by federal regulators that their finances, enrollment, or business model need to “shape up.” One co-op has folded and four others were preparing to close in late December, including top-tier co-ops that federal officials had regarded as best poised to succeed.34 More closure announcements are expected.35 The quick death of these co-ops illustrate that even with heavy federal subsidies, health insurance is a tough business to enter.

THE PROPOSED MERGER IS LIKELY TO HARM CONSUMERS

We have evaluated the potential effects of the proposed megamerger on both (1) the sale of MA products to individuals (the sell side); and (2) the purchase of health care provider (including physician) services (the buy side).36 The AMA has concluded that on the sell side the merger is likely to result in higher premium levels to MA recipients and/or a reduction in the quality of health insurance that can take the form of a reduction in the availability of providers, a reduction in consumer service, etc. On the buy side, the merger could enable the merged entity to lower payment rates for physicians such that there would be a reduction in the quality or quantity of the services that physicians are able to offer patients.

LIKELY DETERIMENTAL EFFECTS FOR CONSUMERS IN THE MA MARKET

Price Increases

A growing body of peer-reviewed literature suggests that greater consolidation leads to price increases, as opposed to greater efficiency or lower health care costs.

Two studies have examined the effects of past health insurance mergers on premiums. A study of the 1999 merger between Aetna and Prudential found that the increased market concentration

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35 Id.
was associated with higher premiums. 37 Most recently, a second study examined the premium impact of the 2008 merger between UnitedHealth Group Inc. and Sierra Health Services. That merger led to a large increase in concentration in Nevada health insurance markets. The study concluded that in the wake of the merger, premiums in Nevada markets increased by almost 14 percent relative to a control group. These findings suggest that the merging parties exploited their resulting market power, to the detriment of consumers. 38

Also, recent studies suggest premiums for employer sponsored fully insured plans are rising more quickly in areas where insurance market concentration is increasing. 39

Consistent with the observation that the loss of competition accompanying health insurer mergers results in higher premiums is research finding that competition among insurers is associated with lower premiums. 40 Research suggests that on the federal health insurance marketplaces, the participation of one new large carrier (i.e. UnitedHealth Group Inc.) would have reduced premiums by 5.4 percent, while the inclusion of all companies in the individual insurance markets could have lowered rates by 11.1 percent. 41 Professor Dafny observes that there are a number of studies documenting lower insurance premiums in areas with more insurers, including on the state health insurance marketplaces, the large group market, and in MA. 42

Plan Quality

The proposed merger can be expected to adversely affect MA product quality. MA plans are already creating very narrow and restricted networks that force patients to go out-of-network to access care. A merger would reduce pressures on MA plans to offer broader networks to compete for members and would create fewer networks that are simultaneously under no competitive pressure to respond to patients’ access needs. As a result, it is even more likely that patients will find themselves in inadequate networks and be forced to access out-of-network care at some point. Similarly, it is very likely that patients will find themselves at in-network hospitals where, given their restricted network plans, many of the hospitals’ physicians will not have been offered a contract by the MA plan.

While the relationship between insurer consolidation and plan quality requires additional research, one study in the MA market found that more robust competition was associated with greater availability of prescription drug benefits. 43 As Professor Dafny observes, “the competitive mechanisms linking diminished competition to higher prices operate similarly with respect to lower quality.” 44

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39 Dafny, supra note 1, at 11.
40 Dafny et al., supra note 1, at 11.
42 Dafny supra note 1, at 11.
43 Dafny supra, note 1 at 11.
THE MONOPSONY POWER ACQUIRED THROUGH THE MERGER WOULD LIKELY DEGRADE THE QUALITY AND REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF PHYSICIAN SERVICES

Just as the merger would enhance market power on the selling side of the MA market, it would also enhance monopsony or buyer power in the purchase of inputs such as physician services, eviscerating physicians’ ability to contract with alternative MA plans in the face of unfavorable contract terms and ultimately inefficiently reducing the quality or quantity of services that physicians are able to offer patients. As Professor Dafny explained in her recent Senate testimony on this merger, “[M]onopsony is the mirror image of monopoly; lower input prices are achieved by reducing the quantity or quality of services below the level that is socially optimal.” She further explained that the “textbook monopsony scenario…pertains when there is a large buyer and fragmented suppliers.” This characterizes the market in which dominant health insurers purchase the services of physicians who typically work in small practices with 10 or fewer physicians.

Even in markets where the merged health insurer lacks monopoly or market power to raise premiums for patients, the insurer still may have the power to force down physician compensation to anticompetitive levels. This is because physicians could not readily replace lost business by refusing the insurer’s contract and dealing with other payers without suffering irretrievable lost income. It is difficult to convince consumers (which in many cases are employers) to switch to different health insurers. Also, switching health insurers is a very difficult decision for physicians because it impacts their patients and disrupts their practice. The patient-physician relationship is a very important aspect to the delivery of high-quality healthcare. And it is a very serious decision both personally and professionally for physicians to disrupt this relationship by dropping a health insurer. Thus, in the UnitedHealth Group Inc./PacifiCare merger, the DOJ required a divestiture based on monopsony concerns in Boulder, Colorado, even though the merged entity would not necessarily have had market power in the sale of health insurance. The reason is straightforward: the reduction in compensation would lead to diminished service and quality of care, which harms consumers even though the direct prices paid by subscribers do not increase.

45 Dafny, supra note 1, at 10.
46 Id.
48 Comments of Prof. Frech at 7 (“…the threat of losing even a small percentage of commercially insured volume may allow an insurer to reduce prices or gain other contractual benefits. Therefore, buyer-side market power is likely to be a problem at lower concentration levels than on the seller side.”)
50 See e.g. U.S. v. UnitedHealth Group and Pacificare Health Systems., Complaint, No. 1:05CV02436, ¶ 37 (December 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/file/514011/download. (As alleged in the United/PacifiCare complaint, physicians encouraging patients to change plans “is particularly difficult for patients employed by companies that sponsor only one plan because the patient would need to persuade the employer to sponsor an additional plan with the desired physician in the plan’s network” or the patient would have to use the physician on an out-of-network basis at a higher cost).
51 See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707 (2007) (explaining reasons to challenge monopsony power even where there is no immediate impact on consumers); Marius Schwartz, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Address before the 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at Northwestern University School of Law 4-6 (October 20, 1999) (noting that anticompetitive effects can occur even if the
In another merger matter occurring in 2010—Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan and Physicians Health Plan of Mid-Michigan—the health insurers abandoned their merger plans when the DOJ complained that the merger “…would have given Blue Cross Michigan the ability to control physician payment rates in a manner that could harm the quality of healthcare delivered to consumers.”

The DOJ’s monopsony challenges properly reflect its conclusions that it is a mistake to assume that a health insurer’s negotiating leverage acquired through merger is a good thing for consumers. On the contrary, consumers can expect higher insurance premiums.” Health insurer monopsonists typically are also monopolists. Facing little if any competition, they lack the incentive to pass along cost savings to consumers.

Consumers do best when there is a competitive market for purchasing physician services. This was the well-documented conclusion reached in the 2008 hearings before the Pennsylvania Insurance Department on the competition ramifications of the proposed merger between Highmark, Inc. and Independence Blue Cross. Based on an extensive record of nearly 50,000 pages of expert and other commentary, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department was prepared to find the proposed merger to be anticompetitive in large part because it would have granted the merged health insurer undue leverage over physicians and other health care providers. This leverage would be “to the detriment of the insurance buying public” and would result in “weaker provider networks for consumers who depend on these networks for access to quality healthcare.”

The Pennsylvania Insurance Department further concluded [O]ur nationally renowned economic expert, LECG, rejected the idea that using market leverage to reduce provider reimbursements below competitive levels will translate into lower premiums, calling this an “economic fallacy” and noting that the clear weight of economic opinion is that consumers do best when there is a competitive market for purchasing provider services. LECG also found this theory to be borne out by the experience in central Pennsylvania, where competition between Highmark and Capital Blue Cross has been good for providers and good for consumers.

For example, compensation below competitive levels hinders physicians’ ability to invest in new equipment, technology, training, staff and other practice infrastructure that could improve the access to, and quality of, patient care. Such investments are critical for enabling physicians to conduct does not adversely affect the ultimate consumers who purchase the end-product), available at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3924.wpd.


Dafny, supra note 1, at 9.


See http://www.ins.state.pa.us/ins/lib/ins/whats_new/Excerpts_from_PA_Insurance_Dept_Expert_Reports.pdf for background information, including excerpts from the experts.

See Statement of Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner Joel Ario on Highmark and IBC Consolidation (January 22, 2009).

Id.
successfully transition into new value-based payment and delivery models. The merged insurer’s exercise of monopsony power may also force physicians to spend less time with patients to meet practice expenses. The mergers may also cause even tighter provider networks, reducing patient access to physicians and effectively curtailing the quantity of their services. When one or more health insurers dominate a market, physicians can be pressured not to engage in aggressive patient advocacy, a crucial safeguard of patient care.

Such reduction in service levels and quality of care causes immediate harm to consumers. In the long run, it is imperative to consider whether monopsony power will harm consumers by driving physicians from the market. Health insurer payments that are below competitive levels may reduce patient care and access by motivating physicians to retire early or seek opportunities outside of medicine that are more rewarding, financially or otherwise. According to a 2015 study released by the Association of American Medical Colleges, the U.S. will face a shortage of between 46,000 - 90,000 physicians by 2025. The study, which is the first comprehensive national analysis that takes into account both demographics and recent changes to care delivery and payment methods, projects shortages in both primary and specialty care.58 Recent projections by the Health Resources and Services Administration similarly suggest a significant shortage of primary care physicians in the United States.59

According to a recent survey by Deloitte, six in 10 physicians said it was likely that many physicians would retire earlier than planned in the next one to three years, a perception that Deloitte stated is fairly uniform among all physicians, irrespective of age, gender, or medical specialty.60 According to the Deloitte survey, 57 percent of physicians also said that the practice of medicine was in jeopardy and nearly 75 percent of physicians thought that the “best and the brightest” may not consider a career in medicine. Finally, most physicians surveyed believed that physicians would retire or scale back practice hours, based on how the future of medicine is changing.61

Likewise, the reduction in the number of MA plans would create MA plan oligopolies that, through coordinated interaction, can exercise buyer power. Indeed the setting of payment rates paid to physicians is highly susceptible to the exercise of monopsony power through coordinated interaction by health insurance companies. The payment rates offered to large numbers of physicians by single health insurers are fairly uniform, and health insurance companies have a strong incentive to follow a price leader when it comes to payment rates.

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59 See Health Resources and Services Administration, Projecting the Supply and Demand for Primary Care Physicians through 2020 in Brief (November 2013).
61 Id.
MSMA Survey Results

A 2016 Missouri State Medical Association (MSMA) survey explored the monopsony issue, guided by the following principle: that a loss of competition on the buy side can occur within the localized geographic markets for the purchase of physician services when the merging health insurers hold contracts with a significant number of physicians who are financially dependent on contracting with the merging health plans.62 This is precisely the case in a merger of Aetna with Humana. Fifty-seven percent of physician respondents to the MSMA survey felt they had to contract with Aetna in order to have a financially viable practice; and 41 percent felt that way with respect to Humana.

While these percentages are indicative of monopsony power, the merger promises to make matters much worse. Eighty-eight percent of responding physicians said that the merger of Aetna with Humana would make the process of contract negotiations less favorable for physicians.

When asked if they had seen an “an all products clause”—a clause in the health plan physician contract that requires, as a condition of participating in any of the health plan products, that the physician participate in all of the health plan products—68 percent reported that they had. Such bundling would not offer any promise of efficiencies and should be viewed with disfavor by anyone interested in fostering competitive markets.

Physicians responding to the MSMA survey also identified by very large percentages a number of anticompetitive effects likely to occur in the event of an Aetna/Humana merger:

- An astonishing 88 percent of physician decision-makers said that there would be a reduction in the quality and quantity of the services that physicians are able to offer their patients; and

- 79 percent reported that they will be very or somewhat likely pressured not to engage in aggressive patient advocacy as a result of the merger.

The extent of the merged entity’s monopsony power and how it may ultimately injure consumers is also revealed in physician responses to the question of whether there would be any consequences in not continuing to contract with the merged firm:

- 35 percent would cut investments in practice infrastructure;
- 41 percent would cut or reduce staff salaries;
- 29 percent would have to spend less time with patients; and

26 percent would cut quality initiatives or patient services.

MERGER EFFICIENCY CLAIMS ARE UNSUPPORTED AND SPECULATIVE

Professor Dafny noted in her Senate testimony that claims of offsetting efficiencies cannot ameliorate the competitive harm from these mergers. “Efficiencies must be merger-specific and verifiable…and there is still the question of whether benefits will be passed through to consumers in light of that diminished competition.” Insurers have a dismal track record of passing any savings from an acquisition on to consumers, and there is no reason to believe that this transaction would be any different. Under these circumstances, we suggest that the Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration (DIFP) review the merging insurers’ efficiency claims with skepticism similar to that expressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the merger case of St. Alphonsus Medical Center and Federal Trade Commission v. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir, 2015). (“The Supreme Court has never expressly approved an efficiencies defense to a section 7 claim…We remain skeptical about the efficiencies defense in general and about its scope in particular.”)

Turning to the health insurers’ specific efficiency claims,

[T]here is no evidence that larger insurers are more likely to implement innovative payment and care management programs…and there is a countervailing force offsetting this heightened incentive to invest in…reform: more dominant insurers in a given insurance market are less concerned with ceding market share.

In fact, “concerted delivery system reform efforts have tended to emerge from other sources, such as provider systems…and non-national payers,” according to Professor Dafny, not from commercial health insurers.

In any event, the vague “innovative payment” and “care management” claims that the health insurers have made in support of the merger are undermined by the studies of consummated health insurance mergers discussed above, which show that the mergers actually resulted in harm to consumers in the form of higher, not lower, insurance premiums.

TO PROTECT CONSUMERS THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE SHOULD REJECT THE APPLICATION TO MERGE

Given that the proposed merger would increase concentration even further in Missouri’s already highly concentrated MA markets, where the merged entity either possessed substantial market shares or could exercise buyer power through coordinated interaction, it is critical for the DIFP to oppose the proposed merger so that consumers and physicians have adequate competitive

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63 Dafny, supra note 1, at 16.
64 St. Alphonsus Medical Center and Federal Trade Commission v. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789-790 (9th Cir, 2015)
65 Dafny, supra note 1, at 16.
66 Id.
alternatives. Unless the application is rejected, the merged entity would likely be able to raise premiums in the MA market, reduce plan quality, and lower payment rates for physicians to a degree that would reduce the quality or quantity of services that physicians offer to patients.

Any remedy short of rejecting the merger application would not adequately protect consumers. A divestiture would not protect against the loss of potential competition that occurs when one of the largest health insurers is eliminated. Moreover, divestiture could be highly disruptive to the marketplace and cause harm to consumers in MA markets where the elderly would be faced with a new insurer.

As a practical matter, the overwhelming number of markets adversely affected by the proposed merger, along with the barriers to entry to health insurance, makes unlikely that the DIFP could find proposed buyers of assets that could supply health insurance at a cost and quality comparable to that of the merger parties in the huge number of affected markets. Moreover, any qualified purchaser able to contract with a cost competitive network of hospitals and physicians, if found, would likely already be a market participant, and a divestiture to such an existing market participant would not likely return the market to even pre-merger levels of competition.

Accordingly, the AMA respectfully urges the DIFP to reject the parties’ application to merge in order to protect consumers from premium increases, lower plan quality and a reduction in the quantity and quality of physician services.
Tables to the Statement of the American Medical Association to the Missouri Department of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration (May 19, 2016)

**Table 1.** Statewide data showing Aetna/Humana merger will be likely to enhance market power in the MA Market in Missouri.

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<th>Total HHI</th>
<th>Total HHI post-merger</th>
<th>Change in HHI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>2610</td>
<td>3930</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.** Missouri MSAs where an Aetna/Humana Merger Will Be Presumed Likely to Enhance Market Power in the MA Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA Name</th>
<th>Total HHI</th>
<th>Total HHI post-merger</th>
<th>Change in HHI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joplin, MO</td>
<td>3686</td>
<td>7152</td>
<td>3466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, MO-KS</td>
<td>3698</td>
<td>6995</td>
<td>3297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson City, MO</td>
<td>3495</td>
<td>6217</td>
<td>2722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield, MO</td>
<td>3154</td>
<td>4909</td>
<td>1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, MO</td>
<td>2903</td>
<td>3730</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis, MO-IL</td>
<td>2848</td>
<td>3118</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Four-Firm Concentration Ratios and Aetna’s and Humana’s Market Shares in Missouri MSAs where an Aetna/Humana Merger Will Be Presumed Likely to Enhance Market Power in the MA Market, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA name</th>
<th>MCO name</th>
<th>Total share</th>
<th>Concentration ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joplin, MO</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City, MO-KS</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson City, MO</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield, MO</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, MO</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis, MO-IL</td>
<td>Aetna</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Humana</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>